The 4th Division's DELTA Course, 1966

Before Recondo School opened in Nha Trang, some 4th Division LRRP team members were trained by the Special Forces DELTA project. In late 1966, the two-week school was called the "4th Division Recondo Preparation Course."

The MACV-RECONDO School had only recently started and was not yet ready to guarantee placement in any specific training cycle. The first class had started on 15 September, with new cycles beginning every two weeks.

DELTA gave lessons on enemy weapons, advanced first-aid techniques, map reading, survival, and other related skills a small recon team would need to know to perform in the field.

This was hard-won knowledge. In May 1964, the Special Forces had started running secret long-range patrols into Laos under LEAPING LENA. There were no rules to follow. SF had to train the Vietnamese CIDG and LLDB (South Viet Special Forces) and participating Americans for these missions as they learned, mission by mission, what best to do. Project DELTA replaced LEAPING LENA in October 1964. DELTA was created to run long range recon and special missions inside enemy-controlled areas of South Vietnam. By late 1965, DELTA was able to train recon personnel other than its own.

Infantry LRRPs were badly needed. In May of 1965, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was the first Army combat unit to arrive in Vietnam, The 173rd deserves credit for recognizing the need and acting on its own, put the first line unit LRRP-type teams in the field, but called them "Delta teams." There was no relation to the SF DELTA.

The 101st came to fight in Vietnam in July 1965. The first non-SF people through the improvised SF course were about ten 101st Airborne troopers in September 1965. The 101st called its special recon teams "Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols." In December, DELTA trained a platoon size group from the "Big Red One" 1st Infantry Division, which was quickly followed by another similar group from the 1st Air Cav.

A problem hampering the training was that the school instructors were also active members of DELTA recon, and they taught classes in between their combat missions. The answer to this was obvious. A permanent training group had to be created.

DELTA set up a training program for men from the 5th and 1st Special Forces groups. These graduates became teachers for the establishment of the DELTA LRRP school. By late 1966, to get as many LRRPs trained as possible, the Special Forces sometimes sent out instructors to the infantry units. It gave the SF "mobile training team" concept a more family-related aspect. "Mobile training" was normally for export to other armies in other countries. The 4th Division seems to be the last line unit trained in this way. With the MACV-RECONDO School in action, there was no need.

I attended the DELTA course that began 17 December 1966. We were lectured on how to recognize real intelligence in the field and how to interpret it, beginning with such basics as "If they're travelling with packs and canteens, you know they're a long way from camp" and ending with oddities like "Ants won't remake a trail after someone has stepped on it. They'll move around and start a new one. Look for this when you're tracking."

Silence was the LRRPs' greatest ally. We modified our weapons and equipment to eliminate potential noises; taping web-gear suspender straps together, tying loose clothing down firmly to keep the cloth from rustling or pocket items from thumping together. Even our metal spoons were padded by tape around the handles to prevent telltale clinking while stirring in the canteen cup. Weapon slings (before the days of the "silent" nylon slings) were removed and sling swivels taped down.

Hand signals were used for communication, and any talking was done mouth-to-ear. Since radios required talking, something not always possible while near enemy positions, prearranged signals with the radio monitoring stations were established that the LRRPs could use by simply keying the handset push-to-talk buttons.

Having the point man advance ahead of the team a few meters, stop, crouch and listen, then wave for the team to follow performed silent movement through the jungle. Once all the men were moved up into their new positions and crouched down out of sight, the point moved on.

It was a slow process, and a team could only hope to progress one to two thousand meters a day, but stealth was absolutely necessary in order to survive in enemy territory.

While on the move, the point would watch his front and both sides. The team leader, five meters behind him, would watch over the point's head for tree platforms (a favorite VC-NVA watchpost) or snipers, while keeping the compass azimuth and marking a pace count so distance could be determined.

The RTO (radiotelephone operator) watched both flanks to make sure the team was not approached from the side, and the tailgun watched over his shoulder as he walked, then turned and faced the rear when the team was stopped.

The only way to stay alive was to see the enemy first -- and at that the LRRPs excelled. We kept our weapons loaded, rounds chambered, and fingers on the trigger. Surprise encounters with enemy soldiers were almost always ended in the LRRPs' favor, since the Communist, as savvy a jungle fighter as he was made out to be, had the fatal habit of carrying his own weapon slung or even unloaded while in a "safe" area.

Since one R of LRRP stands for reconnaissance, the basic mission of the LRRP teams was to get close to the enemy and find out as much about him as possible. Enemy contact, even accidental and possibly resulting in enemy casualties, was a sign of failure on a pure recon mission.

It seemed that if you followed all the rules set down for a recon team operating alone, you couldn't, absolutely could not, be caught. Only those who compromised or made mistakes died. If you do get caught, you have screwed up, and to screw up usually means dying to pay for the sin.

Teams doing their job would find the enemy first, shadow them through the jungle and swamps, and either call in artillery, air strikes, or airmobile infantry.

Artillery support and air strikes were presented to us by act, actually doing it, until directing a fire mission on a target was easy going, even if we was so near the target that the shells jarred our teeth.

Sometimes a team followed and reported on the enemy for days before the situation allowed an attack. This was risky for one's health since Vietcong and North Vietnamese units rarely traveled alone. Mortar platoons always had infantry nearby, and small infantry units had larger units a day away or less by foot.

The gathering of real field intelligence was a skill best learned on the job. Chipped bark at shoulder level on the trees alongside a trail indicated the men who had passed were carrying crew-served weapons on their shoulders. Enemy soldiers seen without their rucksacks were not far from their basecamp. Full canteens and packs hung heavily on the backs of those wearing them, advertising they were on the march.

Even the NVA had routines and procedures. A campfire was manned by one cook who fed a specific number of men. Latrines in the base camp areas had the same significant numerical clue.

The enemy ate at certain times, marched at certain times and in certain orders, and even fell victim to habit when it came to the use of trails, roads, and river or stream crossings.

It was the habits of the enemy that cost them the most men. The LRRPs quickly saw how to exploit the weaknesses we had observed. Pure recon missions gave way to patrols that went out to do battle, hunter-killer teams.

Ambushes were set where trails crossed water, knowing that the VC would pause to rest or fill their canteens. Long-range artillery was pre-zeroed on good campsite areas, and LRRPs hid on hilltops to wait for the dawn wisps of smoke from passing enemy units to blend with the mist rising off the jungle and then call the wrath of distant eight-inch howitzers on them.

Trails that showed evidence of recent movement were staked out and mined with Claymore broadsides, mini M14 shoe mines dotted on all the approach points, and week-long vigils were established in the cane or brush thickets nearby.

Getting an LRRP team into an area was the first problem to be solved, so the method of delivery was carefully considered. Teams could:

(1) be flown in by helicopter (most common), and then walk into the AO (area of operations),

(2) be delivered by water from a boat or sampan, or

(3) simply stay behind, after having blended with a large conventional unit. Parachute insertion, while tried, proved to be impractical for the majority of LRRP missions.

Helicopter insertion made a lot of noise, but since there were helicopters in the air over Vietnam all the time, the enemy could not physically man and watch every usable clearing.

A typical insertion by chopper involved the picking of the least likely landing zone, one that did not tempt the enemy to post guards nearby. Such an LZ was usually waist-high or deeper in foliage, stumps, or rocks. Next, the helicopter carrying the team would try to spend the least amount of time near the ground. Actually hovering over the LZ was dangerous, so the team had to jump from a moving helicopter at the lowest/slowest point in the pass the pilot would make.

By having the helicopter speed through its pass, the distinctive sound of a hovering machine was eliminated. If there were support ships, such as gunships, along with the "slick" carrying the team, they could help add to the ruse by slowing down also, then joining the escaping slick, creating the impression that the whole flight had gone over without a pause.

Two other good tricks the LRRPs used were fake insertions to divert the attention of the enemy and the "DX" (direct exchange) of a team by dropping off one team and picking up another at the same point.

The enemy, if they were aware there was a team in the area, would normally think the team had been extracted and not expect a fresh team to be there to continue the mission.

Team security, be it on an ambush, raid, or recon mission, was still top priority. Men could not toss and turn or talk in-their sleep. If they talked in their sleep, we gagged them. Smoking was usually impossible. Even eating depended on having the time and place for it, and in an excitement-charged pursuit, or a recon so close a team could often get involved inside an enemy perimeter, eating and sleeping had to wait.

Guard shifts were established every night, all the men within touching distance of one another, and plans made as to what to do in various types of emergencies. Equipment was kept packed and ready. Most LRRPs never even took off more than one boot at a time, and only then if we had to inspect our feet, not for sleeping or comfort.

To prevent the enemy from possibly tracking a team into its overnight position, it was policy to wait in one place until almost dark, then to change locations quietly, so a night attack would come where the team had been, not where it was relocated.

Keeping in radio contact with headquarters was irregular. More exotic radios were available, but most LRRP teams used the common issue PRC-25 radio. The tall 15-foot whip antenna was carried and assembled for situation reports, because the short metal combat antenna limited the range of the set to about five miles on a good day.

Because the water in the jungle foliage bounces back radio waves, by transmitting with the whip antenna from high ground, out of the dense forest, a LRRP team could talk with radio relay stations on other hilltops ten or even fifteen miles away. With the shorter combat antenna, a team had to wait for a prearranged time to make contact with an aircraft that could monitor their signal.

We made jungle antennas and strung them in the treetops, using only common wire, and as the instructors said, they worked. Static, skip, meter band, and jamming became realities to us.

Situation reports were made by radio on a routine basis, but rapid emergency radio contact was usually out of the question since the communication conditions had to be right. A team in trouble could not always call for aid. We had to fight, escape, and then make the time and opportunity to tell HQ we were in trouble.

We learned those methods of radio communications we would need as small teams operating beyond normal radio range, and the basics of photography so we could bring back better evidence of our sightings than just verbal description.

We also learned ground-to-air signaling, and how to use the new, top-secret Starlight night-vision scopes.

The medical and survival instruction was particularly more complete than the basic courses we had received in stateside training. A doctor ran the medical course we received in lifesaving techniques designed especially for isolated situations. We used blood expansion kits, arterial clamps, and trachea tubes, the experience broadening for all of us, bringing out an assurance that if we had to, we could do more to save a life than just apply a pressure bandage.

Even simplified dental techniques were covered. Few things can incapacitate a man as much as a toothache, and we found out how to deaden exposed nerves and relieve abscesses.